PRELIMINARY
Introduction
A nearly universal feature of executive compensation contracts is that they are based largely on the performance of the firm. Linking an executive's compensation to her firm's performance is usually viewed as an effective way to induce unobservable effort that is personally costly for the manager but increases shareholder value. However, such a contract also exposes the manager to firm-specific idiosyncratic risk that cannot be diversified without undoing the incentive to exert effort. Consequently, while a performance-based contract induces effort, it also drives a wedge between the discount rates of diversified shareholders and undiversified managers. The result is that optimal investment, financing, and payout policies of the manager are not aligned with those of the shareholders. If shareholders are unable to directly contract on the manager's policy decisions, the manager can be expected to select her own utility-maximizing policies for the firm, which are suboptimal from the viewpoint of diversified shareholders. Thus, a performance-based contract imposes a cost on shareholders.
This paper studies the distortions to optimal firm policy choices, and the cost to shareholders of these distortions, resulting from the manager's undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk imposed by performance-based compensation contracts. We embed an agency conflict between manager and shareholders in a neoclassical model of firm investment and financing decisions. The fact that the manager has control over firm-level policy decisions and shareholders are not able to contract upon the manager's selected policies results in a moral hazard problem in the manager's policy choices as well as her effort. Using the quantitative model, we investigate these policy distortions and their effect on shareholder value.
We find that compensating a risk averse manager with her own firm's equity leads to significant distortions in the manager's chosen policies for the firm. That is, the undiversified manager's optimal policies differ from the policies that would be chosen by a diversified shareholder. Even for modest levels of manager risk aversion, the manager's exposure to firm-specific risk results in long-term underinvestment by the manager. Specifically, the undiversified, risk averse manager's long-run optimal capital stock in the simulated model is about 9% lower than the capital stock that would be chosen by a diversified agent. From the viewpoint of the diversified shareholder, this underinvestment by the manager represents a loss of 1-2% of firm value. This cost is balanced against the compensation contract's benefit of inducing managerial effort, which has a positive effect on shareholder value. As such, one can view our calculated loss in value as the cost of inducing effort from the manager.
If the firm's board and shareholders are maximizing value in setting the incentive-based compensation contract, this also gives an implied valuation of the manager's effort.
Additionally, our results suggest that the investment distortion is asymmetric with respect to the firm's productivity shock. In particular, the difference in manager and shareholder optimal policies is larger following a negative innovation to firm productivity. This suggests that the friction we study is exacerbated when the firm nears failure.
We also provide evidence that a risk averse manager's exposure to idiosyncratic risk can help to explain the well-documented empirical fact that Tobin's Q does a poor job of explaining firm-level investment. Specifically, we run regressions of firm investment on Tobin's Q using simulated data from the model. While Q has some explanatory power for the shareholder's optimal investment policy, it has very little explanatory power for the optimal investment policy of a risk-averse manager. Thus, firms run by risk-averse managers with exposure to their firm's idiosyncratic risk may help to explain the investment behavior we observe in the data.
These results have important implications for executive compensation, firm investment and financing decisions, and corporate governance. First, corporate boards and shareholders face a tradeoff in choosing the degree to which their manager's compensation is tied to firm performance. The benefits of inducing managerial effort must be weighed against the costs of distorting the manager's discount rate, and consequently her optimal policy decisions.
When the policy decisions cannot be contracted upon, the manager can be expected to choose the policies that maximize her own utility. Such policies need not, and generally will not, coincide with the diversified shareholders' optimal policies. Our results show that this divergence can result in a significant loss to shareholders compared to a case where the manager selects the policies that would be chosen by a diversified shareholder.
Our paper lies at the intersection of the literature on executive compensation and firm investment and financing decisions. The former is an extensive literature that examines the problem of compensating a manager when effort is unobservable to shareholders. For the most part, the effect of a manager's compensation contract on her chosen investment and financing policies is not considered in this literature. The latter literature in most cases assumes that there does not exist an agency problem between the manager and outside shareholders. Instead, this literature studies the optimal investment and financing policies of a well-diversified manager whose discount rate is identical to that of diversified shareholders.
The idea that incentivizing executives with their own company's equity and options results in undiversified managers has been previously recognized in the executive compensation literature. Meulbroek (2001) notes that undiversified managers value their own company's stock and options less than the market value determined by diversified investors. She estimates that executives value their option-based compensation between 53% and 70% of its cost to the firm. Hall and Murphy (2002) study the cost, value, and pay/performance sensitivity of executive stock options when these options are held by undiversified, risk averse executives. Similar to Meulbroek (2001) , they argue that the distinction between the compensation package's cost to the company and value to the manager is significant. Additionally, Hall and Murphy (2003) note that stock and options are distributed to managers below the top-level executives. Thus, the distortions we study are likely to be present throughout the firm, not just for a handful of individuals.
While the executive compensation literature has noted the costs to a manager of being undiversified, the implications for the manager's policy choices has been mostly unexplored.
There are a couple of notable exceptions, however. Lewellen (2006) notes that a manager's exposure to firm-specific risk drives a wedge between the optimal financing policy of the manager and a diversified shareholder. She finds empirically that the volatility costs induced by debt can be significant and help to explain the observed leverage ratios for U.S.
firms. Panousi and Papanikolaou (2011) documents empirically that firm investment falls in response to a rise in idiosyncratic risk and this effect is increasing in the fraction of the firm owned by the manager. They attribute this effect to the undiversified idiosyncratic risk borne by managers that have incentive-based compensation packages. Danthine and Donaldson (2010) study the optimal contract in a general equilibrium setting where firms are run by risk averse managers and owned by risk averse shareholders. They derive a contract that maintains the incentive for managerial effort while still keeping the manager's pricing kernel in line with that of the diversified shareholders. To achieve this, the manager holds a portion of her own firm's equity as well as a salary that depends on the aggregate wage bill and aggregate dividend. Chen et al. (2010) study the effects of nondiversifiable risk in the context of entrepreneurial firms. Morellec et al. (2012) study agency effects on firm financing decisions. Specifically, they estimate the agency costs of managerial entrenchment in a contingent claims model of firm financing. Nikolov and Whited (2010) estimate a structural model of firm investment and cash holding to infer the degree to which agency frictions affect firm cash holdings. While we focus specifically on contracts observed in the data, many papers look at agency conflicts within an optimal contracting paradigm, including DeMarzo et al. (2012) , Nikolov and Schmid (2012) , Edmans et al. (2009), and Edmans et al. (2012) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a quantitative model of the firm featuring an agency conflict between manager and shareholders. Section 3 discusses the data and approach we use in calibrating the model parameters. In Section 4 we present results from the simulated model and quantify the impact of the policy distortions and shareholder losses associated with the wedge between the discount rates of undiversified managers and diversified shareholders. Section 5 concludes.
Model
We develop a neoclassical production model of the firm that features agency conflicts between the manager running the firm and outside equity holders. We assume that a manager's effort increases firm value but is personally costly for the manager to exert. Furthermore, the manager's effort and policy decisions for firm investment and financing are unobservable to the outside shareholders. This gives rise to agency conflicts in two dimensions: the manager's choice of effort and her choice of firm policies for investment and financing. We do not explicitly model effort but assume the contract is chosen by the board to induce effort at the second-best optimal level. That effort is valuable is implicit in the board's choice of equity-based compensation.
The economy is populated with a cross-section of heterogenous firms and two types of agents: managers and shareholders. Each firm is run by a manager who makes the policy decisions of the firm. Time is discrete and firms and shareholders have infinite horizons.
Managers are finitely lived. We adopt recursive notation throughout where the superscripts denote next period values.
Firm Production and Investment
Firms are infinitely lived and produce using physical capital, k, subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, z. The firm's profits are given by
where f represents a fixed operating cost. We assume decreasing returns to scale in production, which implies α < 1. A firm's idiosyncratic productivity, z, evolves according to
where is drawn from the standard normal distribution. Each firm is able to scale its operations through changes in its capital stock, k. This physical investment expenditure, i, obeys the capital accumulation constraint
where δ > 0 represents the per period depreciation rate of capital. Investment is subject to adjustment costs of a quadratic form given by
Financing
Each firm's capital investment as well as any distributions to shareholders can be financed from two sources: internal funds resulting from operating profits or by raising additional external equity. Consistent with the existing literature, we assume that raising external equity entails a cost that may contain both a fixed and variable component. Specifically, we follow Gomes (2001) and assume that raising external equity, e, is subject to an issuance cost of the form
where λ 0 , λ 1 ≥ 0.
Firms pay the corporate tax rate τ c on their profits, net of their depreciated capital and fixed payments to the manager, both of which are tax deductible under the U.S. tax code.
Thus, the firm's taxable income is given by
where F is the fixed component of compensation paid to the manager. The equity-based portion of compensation is discussed below.
The Manager
The manager of a firm has full control over all investment, financing, and distribution decisions. Managers are self-interested, meaning that a manager selects firm policies with the objective of maximizing her own lifetime utility, taking the form of her compensation contract as given. The manager's wealth is tied to her firm's performance through the compensation contract and we assume this exposure cannot be undone by trading in other securities. 1 Consequently, the manager's optimally chosen consumption stream will be affected by shocks to firm productivity. We assume the manager is risk averse with concave utility over consumption, resulting in the standard desire to smooth her consumption path.
1 Note that allowing the manager to undo her exposure to idiosyncratic risk of the firm would effectively undo the incentive to exert effort that the exposure is meant to induce.
Outside shareholders are assumed to be unable to perfectly observe or contract on the manager's effort choice and policy decisions, giving rise to a moral hazard problem in both effort and policy decisions. Most of the executive compensation literature has studied the former moral hazard problem while ignoring the latter. In this paper, we focus on the latter moral hazard problem, which results directly from shareholders attempting to mitigate the former. 
Manager's Compensation
One aspect of the firm not directly controlled by the manager is her own compensation, which is composed of a fixed cash salary F and shares of firm equity representing a constant fraction θ of the firm. Because we assume the manager cannot unwind or sell this position, we can view this incentive pay as unvested shares in the firm. For tractability, we exogenously fix the manager's contract and examine the effect of the manager's exposure to firm-specific idiosyncratic risk on her policy choices for the firm. We compare the manager's policy choices with what would have been chosen by the diversified shareholders.
Each period, the manager receives a fixed salary payment, and dividends proportional to their unvested equity holdings. Simultaneously, the manager makes a consumption decision for that period, which may be funded out of existing cash wealth W or from current compensation. Any cash wealth this is held between periods is invested at the risk-free rate. Because W affects the manager's policy decisions and thus firm value, firm value is a function of W .
Each period there is some probability that the manager separates from the firm. A manager's separation from the firm is a random event that follows a Poisson arrival with constant intensity parameter κ. Upon separation, the manager sells her equity holding in the firm and receives utility over final period wealth. We assume that upon separation, a new manager is installed with initial wealth W 0 , and that this information is revealed to 2 We do not explicitly model the friction that prevents shareholders from contracting on the manager's policy decisions. However, the inability to contract on these decisions can be viewed as the manager having private information that is not observed by shareholders. Similarly, although outside the model, manager's may have the ability to choose the volatility of the projects they invest in, so even if investment size was contractible, managers could potentially "shield" assets from risk by choosing low-risk projects.
the market prior to the incumbent manager being able to sell her shares. In effect, each period a manager faces a probability κ of receiving terminal payoff θV (k, z, W 0 ). This ties the manager's compensation to the value of the firm.
The compensation contract is fixed and is not chosen by the manager. However, the firm's net distribution to shareholders, d(k, z, W, k ), is chosen by the manager. Thus, the manager is able to influence her compensation through her choice of firm policies.
3 The manager is also able to indirectly affect her compensation through her policy decisions.
Manager's Optimization Problem
The manager is responsible for making all investment and financing decisions of the firm.
Each period the manager faces a probability κ of being forced to separate from the firm.
That is, a manager's exit follows a Poisson arrival with a constant intensity parameter κ.
Conditional on not exiting at the start of a period, the manager makes a joint investment and financing decision for the firm. For a manager who hasn't separated from the firm in the current period, the manager's lifetime utility is given by
s.t.
where u(·) is per period utility over consumption, ν(·) ≡ Au(·) is the utility derived from total wealth at separation, χ is a binary variable indicating separation from the firm, φ o is a binary variable equal to one if the manager's stock options are dividend protected, τ i is the personal income tax rate the manager faces on interest income, and d(·) is the dividend defined below. Throughout we assume the manager's utility is power with constant relative risk aversion equal to γ:
The manager's budget constraint is given by (9). We rule out borrowing by the manager in (10). Solving the recursive problem given by (7)- (10) gives an optimal policy function for investment, k (k, z, W ).
Shareholders and Firm Valuation
We assume that there is no aggregate risk in the economy. In contrast to managers, who are exposed to their own firm's idiosyncratic risk, shareholders are optimally diversified such that they require no risk premium for holding equity. The firm's equity value is priced in the market by diversified equity holders who, in the absence of systematic risk, discount future equity distributions at the risk-free rate. The firm's equity distributions are chosen by the manager to maximize her own lifetime utility. We assume that shareholders are unable to contract upon the manager's policy choices and instead take the manager's policy functions as given. Because there is a lump-sum payment to the manager at separation to fulfill her equity-based portion of compensation, the value of the firm drops when a manager exit shock hits. Thus, the shareholder value of the firm is given by two Bellman equations, one for when the manager remains with the firm and one for when she separates:
where
and φ d is an indicator for positive distributions to shareholders. The market value of the firm conditional on having not received an exit shock from the manager is given by V (k, z, W ) in (12).
With probability κ the manager separates from the firm and the market value of the firm becomes V χ (k, z, W ) defined in (15), which is distinct from (12) in that the firm must pay the manager the stock-based portion of their compensation contract. Notice that when V (k, z, W ) = 0, the managers incentive pay also goes to zero: C(k, z) = 0. We can therefore move C(k, z) outside the max and rewrite V χ (k, z, W ) in terms of V (k, z, W ):
Shareholders have limited liability, which gives the outer max on the optimization problem in (12) and (15): shareholders have the option and sole discretion to walk away and receive zero.
As a benchmark, we also define the shareholder value of the firm with the conflict between shareholder and manager is shut down. In this case the manager follows the first best optimal investment policy that would be chosen by a shareholder, just as in a standard neoclassical model of firm production. However, to keep this benchmark comparable in outflows due to cost of management, we assume there is a passive manager which receives the same compensation contract as in the the previous version. This benchmark is given by
The primary reason to solve this benchmark is in order to simplify computation of U (k, z, W ) and V (k, z, W ). We use the benchmark to approximate the manager's terminal compensation θV (k, z, W ) by θV 0 (k, z, W ). This eliminates solving the fixed point problem defined by equations (7) and (12). This is a reasonable approximation because corr(V, V 0 )
is very close to one and the magnitude of the distortion in total firm value caused by agency costs is small. However, it is critical that any approximation error does not drive the results.
To avoid problems resulting from approximation error, we use firm value and policy implied by (12) and (15) for the risk neutral manager as the relevant comparison for distortions arising from agency conflict. Our results can therefore be interpreted as distortions resulting from the fact that managers are risk averse, rather than the fact that shareholders are unable to make policy decisions directly.
Data and Calibration
To calibrate the model and study the quantitative effects of the model parameters, we collect data on executive compensation, financial statements, and equity returns for a sample of US public companies. Specifically, we gather data on salary and equity ownership stakes for
CEOs listed in the Execucomp database. This database provides compensation data for a subset of executives of US public companies at an annual frequency for the period 1992-2011.
We supplement these data with firm financial data from the quarterly Compustat database.
Finally, we take monthly equity returns for the corresponding firms from the CRSP database.
We require at least 30 consecutive quarters of a firm's financial data in Compustat and discard firms according to a set of standard filters used in the empirical finance literature.
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Ultimately, we are left with 1,152 firms in our sample for which we have the necessary data to compute the set of firm-level moments we consider. In Table I , we present statistics for the cross-sectional distribution for these firm-level moments and corresponding parameters for our sample of 1,152 firms.
The calibrated model parameters are shown in Table II . All values are at a quarterly frequency. For the production and financing parameters, we follow the literature that studies a similar class of model. Specifically, the capital depreciation rate, δ, is close to the value reported in Cooley and Prescott (1995) and the returns to scale parameter α is consistent with the evidence in Cooper and Ejarque (2003) . The parameterization of the capital ad-justment costs b follows Caballero et al. (1995) and Caballero and Engel (1999) . The equity issuance costs λ is consistent with values in Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2007) .
Additionally, it is consistent with the estimates reported in Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) .
The persistence and volatility of firm productivity (ρ z , σ z ), and the time preference (β) are in line with the parameters used in other neoclassical models of firm investment.
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Parameters that have readily observable counterparts in the data are set using empirical guidance. For example, we choose tax parameters that are in line with the current U.S.
tax code. The manager's ownership stake in the firm θ and fixed pay F are chosen to approximate the average ownership stake and fraction of total compensation which comes from salary observed in the data. The per-period probability of manager separation, κ, is set to 1/30 to generate an average tenure length of 7.5 years which is seen in the data.
Finally, the ratio of utility of terminal period wealth to utility of per-period consumption,
A, is chosen such that the manager's expected wealth at separation time τ is equal to the manager's initial wealth:
This value of A implies that managers neither have a strong motive to save nor spend down their wealth during their tenure. Because we do not observe the trend in manager's wealth, we assume the manager's savings (cash wealth)
is near its long-run mean when the manager is hired. As risk aversion affects the value of wealth in a consumption-savings problem, the calibrated value for A is a function of γ.
4 Model Results
In this section we investigate the results produced from solving and simulating the calibrated model. In particular, we are interested in the effect of managerial risk aversion, coupled with the manager's inability to fully diversify her firm-specific exposure, on a firm's optimal policy choices. To this end, we solve and simulate the model for a risk averse manager with log utility as well as a risk-neutral manager. Throughout, we take the risk-neutral manager as a 5 See, for example, Gomes (2001) , Hennessy and Whited (2005) , or Hennessy and Whited (2007) . 6 The calibrated values for A are 1.1 for the risk neutral manager and 9.3 for the log utility manager.
benchmark in the sense that the nondiversifiable risk does not affect her firm policy choices.
In other words, the optimal policies chosen by the risk-neutral manager coincide with the policies that would be selected by a diversified shareholder. In the case of a risk averse manager, however, the manager's chosen policies differ, at times significantly, from what is optimal for a diversified shareholder.
The optimal investment policy that would be chosen by a risk neutral manager is also the policy that would be optimally chosen if a diversified shareholder were running the firm.
Therefore, the difference between the optimal policy of a risk-averse and risk-neutral manager represents the difference between policies of risk averse manager and diversified shareholders.
We find that the difference in the the manager and shareholder optimal policies is increasing in the degree of the manager's risk aversion. Intuitively, this result is to be expected.
Fixing the compensation contract, as a manager's risk aversion increases, the price of risk she assigns to the idiosyncratic shocks of the firm increase as well. This increases the discount rate the manager applies to a firm's cash flows, however the idiosyncratic shocks have no effect on the risk neutral manager or diversified shareholders' pricing. Consequently, a higher level of managerial risk aversion, for a given compensation contract and level of exposure to firm-specific risk, drives a greater wedge between the optimal policy choices of the undiverisified manager and diversified shareholders.
Model Simulation Results
While the policy functions give some qualitative intuition for the difference in manager and shareholder policies, we are primarily interested in the dynamics of these effects. To study the quantitative implications of the model, we now turn to the simulation results. We run two separate simulations, one for the firm managed by a risk averse manager with log utility and one for a firm that is otherwise ex ante identical but is run by a risk-neutral manager.
Because the model is stationary, we initialize the firm values in the initial period and then simulate for 10,000 periods, discarding the first 1,000 periods. Should the firm exit, another is born in it's place, resetting the state variables for the new firm. We then take time series averages of the moments of interest. Despite the similar mean investment rate, we see that the volatility of the optimal investment rate is higher under the risk averse manager than under her risk neutral counterpart.
Furthermore, this is a significant change in the investment volatility, going from a quarterly value of 1.5% under the risk-neutral manager to 1.8% with the log utility manager. The third row of the table reports the skewness in the investment rate for these two simulated cases. The skewness is positive under both a risk-neutral and risk-averse manager. While the values are close across the two cases, we see a slightly higher value under the risk averse manager. We note again that the risk-neutral manager's policy is the investment policy that would be chosen by a diversified, optimizing shareholder. Thus, the risk averse manager has a more volatile investment rate, with slightly more positive skewness, than what would be chosen by a diversified shareholder. Moreover, we will find that this wedge in optimal investment policies of manager and shareholder is time-varying and depends on the level of firm productivity.
Additionally, we note that the optimal investment rates of the risk averse manager and diversified shareholder are far from perfectly correlated. In Table III the row labeled 'Corr((i/k), (i/k) RN )' displays a correlation of only 0.57 for the investment rate of a log utility and risk neutral manager, noting that the latter perfectly coincides with the investment policy that would be selected by shareholders. Thus, even for relatively low levels of manager risk aversion, the model generates a nontrivial wedge between the optimal policy choices of a risk-averse manager and a diversified shareholder.
From Table III we see that the investment policies of the undiversified manager and di-versified shareholder are not perfectly correlated. Holding the contract fixed, the correlation of these optimal investment policies is decreasing in the level of manager risk aversion. At the same time, the correlation of risk-neutral and risk-averse manager's investment rate with the firm productivity shock are nearly identical and this correlation is unaffected by a change in the manager's risk aversion. However, the manager's optimal investment policy depends on her level of personal wealth, W , as well as the current level of capital stock, k, and the firm productivity, z. The difference in levels of optimal capital stock chosen by risk-averse and risk-neutral managers can also be seen in the plots provided in Figure 2 . Here we plot the simulated paths of capital stock under the optimal risk-averse and risk-neutral manager investment policies. In Panel A of Figure 2 , we plot the level of capital stock under the optimal policy of a risk averse manager with log utility (solid line) and risk-neutral manager (dashed line).
The simulated path of productivity shocks, z, which is fixed across the two cases, is plotted (1986) . In that case, the manager has utility over the size of the firm she manages and consequently overinvests relative to the optimal level that would be selected by a shareholder without such a motive.
In Figure 3 we present impulse responses for the investment policy of a risk-averse and risk-neutral manager following a shock to the firm's productivity, z. A firm is simulated over a long horizon (100,000 periods) and these shocks are identified within the sample path. The "High to High" event occurs when the firm is in a high z state, identified as a specific point on the grid for z, and the next period innovation to z is such that z > z. All such events are identified in the sample path, and a 16 quarter event window, 6 quarters prior and 10 quarters subsequent to the event, is constructed around the event. The figures show the cross-sectional average of these investment rates in event time. This process in repeated for events where z < z conditional z being a high state, giving "High to Low." This is repeated for the cases when the firm is initially in a low z state to give "Low to High" and "Low to
Low."
The results of this impulse response are also displayed in Table V. Panel A of this table shows the average spread between the investment rate of the risk averse and risk neutral manager at event date 1 for four different date 0 to date 1 productivity shock sequences. Examining the first and third rows of Panel A, we see that the risk averse manager's investment rate at date 1 exceeds that of the risk-neutral manager when the event date 0 productivity is high. This is true regardless of whether date 1 shock is high or low, although the spread in investment rates is twice as large when the date 1 shock is also high. We see a similar pattern in rows two and four of this panel, when the date 0 productivity is low. In both of these cases, the risk averse manager underinvests relative to the optimal investment that would be chosen by a diversified shareholder.
Panel B of Table V compares the investment rate of the risk averse and risk neutral manager, conditional on the level of productivity being above or below its mean value. Not surprisingly, both risk averse and risk neutral managers choose a higher investment rate when the has been hit with a high productivity shock compared to a low productivity shock.
The third row reports the difference in these investment rates. As in Panel A, we again see a pattern of state-contingent investment differences. When the firm productivity is below its mean value, the risk averse manager is investing less on average than diversified shareholders would like. Conversely, when the firm is hit with a high productivity shock, the risk averse manager invests at a higher rate than what would be optimally chosen by a diversified
shareholder. This pattern of overinvestment in high productivity states and underinvestment in low productivity states is what generates a higher unconditional investment volatility for the risk averse manager relative to the risk neutral one, as reported in Table III 4
.2 Shareholder Losses and the Value of Effort
Ultimately, the underinvestment by the risk averse manager results in a value loss to shareholders. A diversified shareholder's optimal firm size is larger than what is optimally chosen by the risk-averse, undiversified manager and this difference is a loss borne by the shareholders. In Table III , the row labeled "Value Loss" presents the computed value loss to shareholders for the log utility manager case that we consider. In both the risk-neutral and risk averse cases, the manager is undiversified, however, the value loss to shareholders only occurs for the case where the manager is risk averse. In this case case (column two), exposure to firm-specific risk distorts the manager's optimal policy and this distortion results in a value loss to shareholders.
For the case of a log utility manager, the distortion in optimal policy choices results in a loss of 1.36% of firm value. That is, if the manager selected the policies that are optimal from the viewpoint of a diversified shareholder, the value of the firm to the shareholders would increase by 1.36%. This is a significant cost to the firm, even for a case where the manager's risk aversion is relatively low. This value loss is interesting in its own right, but it also gives insight into the value of a manager's effort.
In Table IV , we provide comparative statics for value loss as we change underlying parameters of the model. For each entry, we solve and simulate the model under an alternative parameter value, fixing all other parameters at their calibrated benchmark values provided in Table II . We can see that the sensitivity of value loss to the underlying parameters differs significantly for the parameters we consider.
Generally, the change in value loss with respect to an underlying parameter goes the direction one would expect. An increase in the fraction of manager ownership, θ, results in an increase in value loss, all else equal. Increasing θ makes the risk averse manager more exposed to the firm's equity value, which generates a greater distortion in her optimal investment relative to the optimal policy of a risk-neutral manager. Conversely, an increase in the manager's salary, holding fixed her equity compensation, makes her total wealth less sensitive to the firm, reducing the degree of the investment distortion. An increase in the persistence, ρ, and volatility, σ, of the firm's productivity process, z, both result in an increase in the value loss. Finally, we see that κ, the probability of a manager's exit, is inversely related to the firm's value loss. That is, an increase in a manager's expected tenure length results in a greater distortion in optimal capital level and investment policy, which increases the value loss.
The previous discussion of value loss holds fixed the manager's effort, which presumably has a positive effect on shareholder value. Thus, compensating a manager with her own firm's equity has the benefit of inducing effort but the cost of driving a wedge between the discount rates, and therefore the optimal investment and financing policies, of manager and shareholder. Thus, the loss in shareholder value discussed above can be viewed as the cost of inducing effort by the manager. From this view, our results suggest that, assuming shareholders and boards of directors are maximizing shareholder value, the value of managerial effort induced by equity-based compensation is significant. In particular, it ought to be the case that the benefits of inducing effort are at least as large as the cost, which we find to be of an economically important magnitude.
In Table VI we present investment regressions using simulated data produced by the model. We regress the firm investment rate on a constant and Tobin's Q, which is given by V /k in the model. We consider two specifications that differ in the agent setting firm investment policy. In the first specification, we use the investment rate that is optimally chosen by a risk-neutral manager. This coincides with the investment policy that would be chosen by shareholders in the model. In the second regression, we use the risk-averse manager's optimal investment policy.
Examining the estimates of the b 1 coefficient and R 2 in each of these regressions, we note a significant difference. Firm Q has much stronger explanatory power for the investment policy of the risk-neutral manager. In contrast, very little of the variation in the risk-averse manager's optimal investment policy is explained by variation in the firm's Q. This limited explanatory power is consistent with what has been documented empirically. 7 Thus, the channel of idiosyncratic risk exposure distorting a risk averse manager's optimal investment policy helps to explain the the poor empirical performance of Tobin's Q in explaining firmlevel investment.
Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of incentive-based executive compensation contracts on firm investment and financing policies. Contracts that compensate a manager with her own company's stock or options expose the manager to firm-specific risk that is not priced by diversified investors in equilibrium. Allowing a manager to diversify away this firm-specific risk would eliminate the effort-inducing incentive effects that such contracts are meant to produce. The effect of this undiversified idiosyncratic risk on an executive's valuation of her own company stock and options has been previously identified and studied in the executive compensation literature as a cost of this type of contract. However, our paper is the first to study the effects of these contracts on the investment and financing decisions that an undiversified manager makes for the firm.
We find that an incentive-based contract can significantly distort the firm policy choices of a risk averse manager. From the calibrated model we see that the capital stock chosen by the undiversified, log utility manager is approximately 9% below the level that would be selected by a diversified shareholder. This underinvestment by the manager results in a 1.4% loss in firm value to shareholders. Alternatively, this value loss can be viewed as the cost of inducing the firm value-maximizing level of effort from the manager. This table presents the difference in investment policy chosen by a risk averse and risk neutral manager following a shock to the firm's level of productivity, z. In Panel A, we report the difference in the investment rate of a risk averse manager with log utility and a risk neutral manager: (i/k) − (i/k) RN for the period immediately following the date of the shock, for four cases of shocks realized at date 0 and date 1. In Panel B, we report the investment rate at date 0 for the log utility and risk-neutral managers for the case when date 0 productivity is low (first column) versus when it is high (second column). is the firm's investment rate at date t and Q t is the market-to-book ratio at date t, represented by V t /k t in the model. We run the regression for two different investment rates: the shareholder's optimal investment policy (1) or the risk-averse manager's optimal investment policy (2). We present the coefficient estimates from an OLS regression with their associated standard errors in parentheses. The regression R 2 is provided in the final column. for investment under different levels of a manager's risk aversion. In each panel, the solid line represents the investment policy decision of a risk averse manager with log utility while the dashed line represents the decision of a risk-neutral manager. In Panels A and B, at date 0, the firm is hit with a low productivity shock. In Panel A, the firm is subsequently hit with a high productivity shock in the next period, at date 1. In Panel B the firm is hit with another low productivity shock at date 1. Panels C and D plot analogous impulse responses when the firm is hit with a high productivity shock at date 0. At date 1, the firm is hit with a low productivity shock (Panel C) or another high productivity shock (Panel D).
